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We have investigated a situation in which externally available response alternatives and
their internal representations could be dissociated, by suddenly removing some action
alternatives from the response space during the interval between the free selection and
the execution of a voluntary action. Choice reaction times in this situation were related
to the number of initially available response alternatives, rather than to the number of
alternatives available effectively available after the change in the external environment.The
internal representations of response alternatives appeared to persist after external changes
actually made the corresponding action unavailable. This suggests a surprising dynamics
of voluntary action representations: counterfactual response alternatives persist, and may
even be actively maintained, even when they are not available in reality. Our results high-
light a representational basis for the counterfactual course of action. Such representations
may play a key role in feelings of regret, disappointment, or frustration. These feelings
all involve persistent representation of counterfactual response alternatives that may not
actually be available in the environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Voluntary action involves selection of one action alternative
amongst a series of equally available ones. Rapidly changing
environments may impose sudden changes to the set of effec-
tively available alternatives. Imagine a field hockey player running
toward the goal with a ball, and coming to face the goalkeeper.
Whilst she is deciding whether to push the ball right or left to the
goalkeeper, a defense player suddenly comes to block the left side
of the goal, leaving the attacker with only one effective alternative
(pushing the ball to the right) if she wants to get the goal.
Several components can be identified in these situations
of action selection. First, an internal response space must be
constructed, containing representations of possible alternative
responses (Fletcher et al., 2000). Next, one response (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007) must be selected from the response space. Finally,
the corresponding action must be prepared and executed (Deecke
et al., 1969). Clearly, these processes may be dynamically updated
with changes in the environment. For example, the motor plan
may need to be adjusted, or completely switched after it has been
selected (Wise and Mauritz, 1985; Snyder et al., 2000; Resulaj et al.,
2009). A final step in the process is often neglected: the representa-
tions of the non-selected (or counterfactual) response alternatives
must be dismantled (Logan et al., 1984).
Early views of action selection considered these processes to
occur serially (e.g., Keele, 1968). However it is now widely rec-
ognized that these are not independent processes, and that they
instead occur in parallel, and influence each other by competitive
inhibition (Cisek, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). For example,
there is converging evidence suggesting that action selection is in
play until relatively late in the chain of events, and that it co-occurs
with action preparation (Sakai et al., 2000; Cisek and Kalaska,
2005; Klein-Flügge and Bestmann, 2012). Importantly, parallel
processing models are not consistent with the notion of a single,
definitive process of action selection. Rather,multiple action repre-
sentations may persist with different levels of activation, through
an extended period of preparation, until one dominant action
emerges from the competition. On this view, an action may be
actively entertained even if it is not the “front-runner” in the
response selection process, and ends up being counterfactual. This
parallelism of voluntary action representations could allow for
adequate flexible behavior in a dynamic environment. Suppressing
a response alternative too early may make it harder to reactivate
it if circumstances require. A concomitant disadvantage of par-
allelism is that non-selected alternatives may remain needlessly
activated.
Unselected, counterfactual action representations have proved
difficult to study for the simple methodological reason that they
have no behavioral output. Therefore, most current knowledge
comes from animal studies where it is sometimes possible to record
directly the neural signals involved in decision processes (Cisek
and Kalaska, 2005), or from human imaging studies where the rel-
ative reward value of the non-chosen alternative should be tracked
(Boorman et al., 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011).
We have developed an indirect, behavioral measure of coun-
terfactual action based on the number of alternatives in the
response space. In a choice reaction task, the reaction time
depends strongly on the number of potential response alternatives
(response set size). Hick (1952) found monotonic, increasing rela-
tions between reaction times (RTs) and set size, now widely known
as “Hick’s law.” Hick’s Law is often explained by the additional
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time required to compare a stimulus repeatedly with each entry
in a stimulus-response look-up table, and thus retrieve the correct
action from the response space. Importantly, a crucial distinction
must be made, between external and internal response sets – or
“in the world” and “in the brain” c.f. (Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
The former refers to the response alternatives that are effectively
available in the external environment. The latter refers to the
internal representations of the alternatives within the response
space. While the external and internal sets should normally match,
they need not do so, and only internal set sizes can influence
RTs. This possibility allows us to test whether an unselected and
unexecuted action is nevertheless represented within the inter-
nal response set. In particular, a higher RT than the external set
size would predict could potentially be explained by the presence
of an additional, counterfactual action representation within the
response space.
Hick’s law has classically been applied to instructed actions,
where a stimulus explicitly tells participants which action to make
in every trial. In voluntary actions, by contrast, there are no
explicit instructions about which action to make, and the par-
ticipant instead freely selects one action from the response space.
The underlying neural structures of voluntary actions differ from
those for instructed actions (Krieghoff et al., 2011). In particular,
voluntary action, but not instructed action, in parallel models of
action selection may lead to feelings of regret (Boorman et al.,
2009). Feelings of regret can be defined as a negative value in the
comparison between the outcomes of the chosen alternative with
the counterfactual alternative (Coricelli et al., 2005). To make this
comparison, the relative value of the chosen and un-chosen alter-
natives should be computed. Therefore, some representation of
the counterfactual alternatives must remain until after the choice
was made. Thus, regret implies the persistent representation of
actions that were included in the response space, but were not in
fact selected.
Here, we asked whether internal response sets retain traces of
counterfactual action when the external response set changes, by
using an experimental analog of the hockey goal shooting exam-
ple mentioned at the start of this article. The task necessitated
three main features. First, it should present participants with a
dynamic response space, in which some freely selected alterna-
tives might suddenly become unavailable. Second, the task should
allow the initially selected (but subsequently inhibited) response
to be identified. For this aspect, we relied on participant’s sub-
jective reports made after the trial. Third, and crucially, the task
had to provide an implicit behavioral measure demonstrating the




Eighteen naïve participants (11 female, mean age± SD;
24± 5 years) took part in the study. One participant did not update
their choice following changes in the number of available alterna-
tives, and in fact selected disappeared locations. Their data was
therefore excluded from the analysis. This yielded a total of 17
participants. All participants had normal or corrected to nor-
mal vision. Procedures were approved by the University College
London research ethics committee and were in accordance with
the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
TASK
We asked participants to voluntarily select a response from an ini-
tially available set of responses. Once an intentional decision had
been made, but before the response was executed, the external
response set was suddenly reduced. On some trials, therefore, the
response that the participant had already selected would become
unavailable, and they would need to reselect another, alternative
response from the updated external response set. Using RTs as
a proxy for the internal response set size, we addressed whether
the internal response set had been rapidly updated to match the
new external response set, or whether the internal response set
lagged behind the external changes (see Figure 1). Two scenarios
were possible. In the first place, the internal representation of the
response alternatives could perfectly track the external response
set. Alternatively, the internal representation of the response alter-
natives could contain a persistent representation of the initially
selected and now unavailable response.
Because the size of the response set is different, the two cases
can be distinguished using Hick’s Law, even if they are behaviorally
identical. If initially selected response alternatives were effectively
removed from the internal response set once they become unavail-
able, RTs would increase as a function of the final response set size
(and not the initial response set size). Conversely, if the neural rep-
resentation of the initially selected but now unavailable response
is maintained in the internal response set, then RTs would increase
as a function of the initial response set size.
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor with a refresh rate
of 60 Hz. Participants sat 60 cm away from the screen. The exper-
iment consisted of six blocks of 100 trials and lasted for approx-
imately 50 min. Each trial belonged to one of four experimental
conditions that will be described thoroughly below. These were
no change (34% of the total number of trials), instructed selec-
tion (20%), and original selection and reselection (together, 46%).
The exact proportion was partly determined by the participants’
behavior, see below.
At the start of each trial, one to four different numbers were dis-
played on the screen, arranged around a central fixation cross with
2˚ eccentricity (see Figure 2). Number location and identity were
randomized. All stimuli were displayed over a black background.
We used numbers as targets because we sought to minimize the
working memory load on both target selection and recall, mini-
mizing in turn the problems and potential biases associated with
subjective report.
The set of numbers first presented in each trial was the initial
response set. Numbers in the initial response set were randomly
sampled without repetition from the numbers 1–9 excluding the
number 5 (see instructed condition below). The numbers in the
initial response set were displayed in white for either a short or a
long exposure times (ETs). Short ETs were periods of 550 ms with
a random jitter of a maximum of ±200 ms. Long ETs were peri-
ods of 1500 ms with random jitters of a maximum of ±200 ms.
Participants were asked to covertly select one of the numbers in
the initial response set during the ETs, and to prepare to move
a cursor and click on the number using a large trackball mouse
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FIGURE 1 | Rationale and hypothesis of the study. An initial
external response set suddenly changes (in the example of the figure,
response alternative A2 suddenly becomes unavailable). In these
cases, the internal representation of the response alternatives must
be updated to reflect the changes in the external environment. Two
scenarios are thus possible. The internal response set may be flexible
(Null hypothesis: H0), and can update its contents to respond rapidly
to external changes. Alternatively (Experimental hypothesis: H1), the
internal response set may be resilient to change, and the internal
response set may lag behind changes in the external environment.
FIGURE 2 | Experimental task. The initial response set of numbers was
presented for either a short (350± 200 ms) or a long (1500± 200 ms)
exposure time (ET). Participants covertly selected a number during the
exposure time. A change of fixation color indicated the go signal.
Participants could then move a cursor to click on a number of their choice.
At the same time as the go signal onset a subset of the presented
numbers could disappear, leaving a final response set with a size between
1 and the original response set size. Participants could click on their
originally chosen number if it remained in the final response set. Instead,
they would have to reselect a number other than their first choice if it had
disappeared from the final response set. Participants then reported their
original number choice.
(Keytools Ltd., Southampton, UK). They were instructed to make
a new free selection on each trial, avoiding stereotyped responses
or sequential patterns. The ETs was varied to allow more or less
time for this initial selection process. Short and long ETs were ran-
domly assigned to experimental trials. We assumed that longer ETs
would allow for stronger action preparation and a stronger, and
therefore more persistent, encoding of the initial response set.
After the ETs, the fixation cross changed color, from white to
red. This was the “Go” signal, instructing participants to move
to the selected target number. Crucially in the original selection
and reselection conditions, a subset of the numbers in the ini-
tial response set disappeared at the time of the Go signal. The
remaining numbers changed color and turned to green. The num-
ber of disappearing targets varied from zero to n− 1, where n is
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the initial response set size. Consequently, the final response set
varied from one item to the full initial response set. The positions
and identity of the disappearing numbers were fully randomized.
After the go signal, participants moved the trackball to bring
the cursor to the selected number, and clicked the mouse button.
They were instructed to make this action as quickly and as rapidly
as possible. If the originally chosen number had disappeared from
the final response set, participants were asked to reselect a dif-
ferent number, from the smaller final response set of available
alternatives. Otherwise, they were to execute the originally selected
response.
After clicking on the target number, participants reported
which number they had originally chosen in all conditions, and
regardless of which number they had clicked on. In this way, trials
in which reselection had occurred could be identified on the basis
of subjective report. We assumed that reselection had occurred
if the reported original choice did not match the clicked num-
ber, and if the original choice had disappeared. Otherwise, trials
were classified as “simple selection” (see Figure 3B). At debriefing,
no participant reported difficulties in the report of their original
choice.
Our task crucially required that participants did indeed select
from the initial response set, rather than simply wait for the appear-
ance of the final response set, as only then could we evaluate the
persistence of suddenly unavailable response alternatives. We used
two strategies to ensure that participants attended to the initial
response set, and selected an action from it. First, we included
instructed trials. If the number“5”was found in the initial response
set, participants were instructed to always select this number, and
execute the corresponding response on seeing the Go signal. No
numbers were removed from the initial response set in instructed
trials. Second, to prevent participants from simply waiting for the
final response set, we included a no change condition, in which the
Go signal appeared but no numbers were removed from the initial
response set (see Figure 3A).
To encourage action preparation following the initial response
set, and therefore inhibition of the prepared response, we rewarded
participants for quick responses (measured as time to click on
the target relative to the onset of the go signal, i.e., the sum
of reaction time and movement time). We informed partici-
pants that they would get 0.5 p extra for every trial that was
quicker than their own average in the preceding block. There-
fore, the experimental design discouraged the potential strategy
of ignoring the initial response set completely and waiting for the
final response set instead. Participants earned on average £ 2.23
(±SD £0.03).
To discourage participants from adopting a predetermined
choice strategy, both the identity and the spatial location of the
targets varied randomly from trial to trial. Randomly sampled
numbers were displayed on the vertices of a square with an angu-
lar tilt of either 0˚ or 90˚. The position of the targets was fully
randomized.
FIGURE 3 | Examples of all four experimental conditions. (A) Conditions
with equal initial and final response set sizes. If a number “5” was present
in the initial response set, participants were instructed to click on it
(instructed condition). In the no change condition, the number choice was
intentional. (B) Conditions with non-matching initial and final response set
sizes. In the original selection and reselection conditions, some numbers
disappeared from the initial response set. A trial was sorted as original
selection if participants reported that their original choice matched their final
choice. Instead, a trial was sorted as reselection if participants reported
having chosen a number that had become unavailable. ni and nf indicate the
initial and final response set sizes, respectively. They were not displayed in
the experiment.
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Importantly, the initial and final response set sizes were not cor-
related. This allowed us to test for the independent contributions
of these parameters to RT.
Before starting the experiment, participants had a short prac-
tice session of 40 trials. The mean movement time during this
practice session was recorded to calculate the number of rewarded
trials in the first experimental block. The data from the practice
session were otherwise not further analyzed.
DATA ANALYSIS
Reaction times were calculated as the time at which the mouse
speed first increased above zero after the go signal. Because of the
screen refresh rate (60 Hz), RTs were obtained with a relatively low
temporal precision, of one sample every∼16.7 ms. Trials with RTs
under 100 ms were rejected, as potentially anticipatory. In the same
way, trials with RTs longer than 1000 ms were rejected. Movement
times were calculated as the time taken to click within 20 pixels of
the number target, relative to the Go signal. Therefore, movement
times included RTs.
To calculate the relationship between RT and response set size,
linear regressions were obtained for each participant’s data, and
the slopes analyzed RTs were fitted with a linear function, rather
than the logarithmic relation normally used for Hick’s Law, for
several reasons. First, RTs increase with increasing response set
sizes, but a strict logarithmic relationship has not been tested
(Lau et al., 2004; Van Eimeren et al., 2006; Kühn et al., 2009;
Zhang et al., 2012). Second, the response set sizes considered
here (1–4) would fall on the rising arm of the logarithmic
function, so could be approximated linearly. Finally, our aim
was to establish whether RTs were affected by either initial or
final response set sizes, regardless of the precise form of the
relationship.
RESULTS
Participants made few omission errors in instructed trials. There
was a mean omission rate of 0.94± 0.3%. After rejection of omis-
sion trials, an average (±SD) of 114± 2 trials were included in
the instructed condition, 186± 5 trials in the no change condition,
126± 17 trials in the selected condition and 150± 18 trials in the
reselected condition. The original selection and reselection con-
ditions presented the highest variability in the number of trials
across participants because the exact number of trials that fell in
each condition depended on each participant’s behavior. Based on
the total number of trials and the combination of initial and final
response set sizes, the mean expected number of reselection trials
was 139, comparable to the figure obtained.
Trials with RTs shorter than 100 ms were rejected, as potentially
anticipatory. Overall, 26± 24% trials were rejected, across all par-
ticipants and conditions. The high number of mean rejected trials
was mainly driven by two participants who had a strong tendency
(>60% of trials) to anticipate their movements to the Go signal.
The results reported here remained valid when we excluded the
data from these participants from the analysis.
Differences between the proportions of rejected trials were
examined. A two-way 4× 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors of condition and ET revealed significant differences
between conditions (F 3,48= 48.16, p< 0.001). The highest pro-
portion of rejected trials due to anticipation was in the instructed
condition, where participants knew that the instructed target
(“5”) would not disappear. There were no significant differences
between the proportion of rejected trials in the critical selected and
reselected conditions (F 1,16= 0.98,p= 0.338). Average numbers of
trials are shown in Table 1.
CONDITIONS WITH NO CHANGES IN SET SIZE
In trials in which no numbers disappeared from the initial response
set, initial and final response sets were equivalent, so the only fac-
tors of interest were condition (instructed/no change) and ETs
(short/long). The RT averaged across all participants for each
response set size is shown in Figure 4.
To explore the effect of ET and voluntary selection, we obtained
the mean RTs collapsed across all response set sizes for each
condition (Figure 4). A 2× 2 ANOVA with the factors of con-
dition (no change/instructed) and ET revealed a main effect of ET
(F 1,16= 22.26, p< 0.001), suggesting that participants prepared
their motor response during the ET.
There was also a significant main effect of condition
(F 1,16= 27.02, p< 0.001), and a significant interaction effect
(F 1,16= 11.01, p= 0.004). Follow-up t -tests revealed a significant
difference between the instructed and no change conditions for
short ETs (t 16=−2.14, p= 0.048), and a strongly significant dif-
ference for long ETs (t 16=−8.73, p< 0.001). The longer RTs for
the no change condition compared to the instructed condition
reveal an RT cost for voluntary action selection in the former.
To test the effects of set size on RTs, we fitted linear regressions
to each participant’s data in each cell of the design, and performed
a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with factors of condition
(no change/instructed) and ET (short/long) on the estimated slope
parameters (see Figure 4).
Results revealed a main effect of condition (F 1,16= 14.28,
p= 0.002) but no significant main effect of ET (F 1,16= 0.09,
p= 0.773) or interaction effect (F 1,16= 0.14, p= 0.709). The sig-
nificant main effect of condition was expected, and consistent
with Hick’s law. Whereas voluntary response selection amongst
larger sets should have an RT cost in the no change condition, the
response set size should have no effect on instructed RTs, since
there is no selection process other than visually searching for the
target.
Table 1 | Final mean (±SD) number of trials per condition after rejecting incorrect and anticipatory trials.
Condition Instructed Original selection Reselection No change
ET Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long
Mean number of trials (±SD) 38±16 38±15 58±22 57±20 48±17 47±17 69±22 69±25
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FIGURE 4 | Reaction times as a function of response set size for (A), short exposure time trials and (B), long exposure time trials. Error bars show
standard error of the mean.
CONDITIONS WITH DIFFERENT INITIAL AND FINAL RESPONSE SETS
In the selected and reselected conditions, one or more numbers
were removed from the response set. Consequently, the initial and
final response set sizes differed. RTs as a function of either the
initial set size or final response set sizes are shown in Figure 5.
Our design carefully ensured that the initial and final response
set sizes were not correlated. For example, trials with an initial
response set of four could have any of the possible final response
set sizes of 1, 2, 3, or 4. Similarly, trials with an initial response set
of 3 could have any of the possible final response set sizes of 1, 2, or
3. Therefore, the relationship between mean RT and the size of the
initial response set could potentially differ from the relationship
between the mean RT and the size of the final response set. We
could use this design feature to investigate whether the internal
representation was updated to match the final set size. Updating
the internal representation predicts a stronger relation between RT
and final set size than between RT and initial set size, while failure
to update predicts the opposite pattern.
To examine the effects of reselection on RTs, we first analyzed
the mean RTs, irrespective of set size, by incorporating the factor
of response set into a 2× 2× 2 ANOVA with the factors of ET
(short/long), condition (selected/reselected), and set (initial/final).
There was a main effect of ET (F 1,16= 39.24, p< 0.001), suggest-
ing that long ETs allowed for stronger motor preparation than
shorter ETs, and validating the ET manipulation. We also found a
significant main effect of condition (F 1,16= 14.06, p= 0.002). We
interpret this as an RT cost of the inhibition of the original action
plans and the process of number reselection.
We also found a main effect of response set (F 1,16= 6.33,
p= 0.023), with larger response sets generally associated with
larger RTs. There was a significant response set× ET interaction
(F 1,16= 9.54, p= 0.007). There were no other significant effects.
More importantly, we analyzed the slopes of the individual
linear fits for the RTs in a repeated measures 2× 2× 2 ANOVA.
Differences between the slopes allowed us to infer whether an
updating of internal representation did or did not occur when
disappearance of an item from the initial response set triggered
reselection. The mean slope estimates for the selected and reselected
conditions are shown in Figure 6.
Results from the three way ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of ET (F 1,16= 6.87, p= 0.019), presumably also revealing
the results of increased motor preparation.
Importantly, we also found a main effect of response set
(F 1,16= 5.12, p= 0.038), and a significant response set× ET inter-
action (F 1,16= 6.551, p= 0.021). This indicates that the initial
response set size had a stronger impact on RTs than the final
response set size. No other effects were significant.
To investigate the response set× ET interaction, the slope esti-
mates were collapsed across conditions. Follow-up t -tests revealed
no differences between initial and final response set sizes in the
short ET conditions (t 16= 0.28, p= 0.779), but clearly significant
differences between the initial and final response set sizes in the
long ET conditions (t 16= 4.04, p< 0.001). When participants had
enough time to represent the initial response space and prepare
actions (in long ET conditions), the number of initially available
response alternatives seem to have a measurable effect on RTs, even
if the selected alternative later became unavailable. This suggests
that the internal representation of the response space, once it is
built, is not fully updated if the number of response alternatives is
reduced. That is, the internal representation of the response space
displays persistence.
RTs AS A FUNCTION OF THE BINARY LOGARITHM OF THE RESPONSE
SET SIZE
We obtained the above results by estimating linear fits of the RTs
as a function of the different response set sizes (see Materials and
Methods). As a control, we also explored whether the same results
would be valid if the RTs were described as a function of the
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FIGURE 5 | RTs averaged across all participants. (A,B) show
the mean RTs as a function of the initial and final response set
sizes, respectively. For long exposure time (ET) trials, RTs increase
monotonically with the initial response set size, but not with the
final response set sizes. Error bars show standard error of the
mean.
binary logarithm of response set size, as established by Hick’s law
(Hick, 1952). Because a maximum of four response set sizes are
not enough to produce reliable estimates of the parameters of a
logarithmic function, we considered the linearized response set
size. In other words, we conducted the same analyses, but consid-
ering RTs as a function of the binary logarithm of the response set
size, rather than as a function of the response set size itself. This
analysis yielded similar results as the ones reported above.
A 2× 2× 2 ANOVA on the slopes of the RTs as a function of
the binary logarithm of the response set size revealed a main effect
of response set (F 1,16= 9.17, p= 0.008), a marginally significant
effect of ET (F 1,16= 4.41, p= 0.052), and a marginally significant
effect of condition (F 1,16= 4.41, p= 0.051). There was a trend
for a significant response set× condition interaction (F 1,16= 3.99,
p= 0.06). No other effects were significant.
Finally, in the analysis reported above, we calculated RTs as the
first point in time at which the speed of the cursor was non-zero.
To ensure that the obtained results were not an artifact of the way
in which the RTs were defined, we performed the same analysis
on the slopes of the linear fits in two alternative ways. First, we
calculated RTs as the time at which the cursor had covered 25%
of the total distance in each trial. Second, we performed the same
analysis on movement times, calculated as the time to click on the
final target. In both cases, the three way repeated measures ANOVA
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FIGURE 6 | Mean slope of the linear fit to the RTs as a function of response set size, for either initial (A) or final response set sizes (B). For long
exposure time (ET) trials, RTs increase as a function of the initial, but not the final, response set size. Error bars show standard error.
yielded a significant effect of response set (F 1,16= 12.8, p= 0.003
and F 1,16= 13.32, p= 0.002, respectively).
In sum, the main effect of response set size remained after
addressing the relationship between RTs and response set sizes in a
way that followed more strictly the formulation of Hick’s law. The
effect was not highly sensitive to the way in which the RTs were
calculated.
DISCUSSION
In this study we aimed at answering the question of whether
selected response alternatives that are no longer available in the
environment nevertheless remain represented in the brain. The
internal response sets driving RTs corresponded more closely
to the initial than to the final external response sets. This sug-
gests that the internal response sets are in fact resilient to exter-
nal change, and “lag behind” sudden changes in the external
environment.
CONDITIONS WITH EQUIVALENT INITIAL AND FINAL RESPONSE SET
SIZES: INSTRUCTED AND NO CHANGE
We first compared the no change and instructed conditions, where
the initial and final set sizes were indistinguishable. Whereas
the no change condition required intentional response selection,
the instructed condition required only visual search to iden-
tify the instructed target. The no change condition was infor-
mative of the relationship between the RTs and the response
set size. RTs in the no change condition showed a positive lin-
ear relation with response set size. Conversely, RTs in instructed
trials did not depend on the response set size (i.e., the esti-
mated slopes of the linear trends did not differ significantly
from zero). This may seem surprising, as monotonic increases
in instructed RTs as a function of response set size have been well
documented (Hick, 1952). In this experiment, however, the ET
temporally separated the processes of visual search and action ini-
tiation. This may explain the null effect of response set size on
instructed RTs. Importantly, this validates the ET manipulation,
aimed at allowing for selection and motor preparation, and sug-
gests that the results cannot be easily explained by visual search
processes.
We analyzed the effects of ET (short vs. long) and condition
(instructed vs. no change). Shorter ETs were associated with longer
mean RTs and with steeper dependencies of RTs on response
set size. This suggests that longer ETs allowed for movement
preparation, reducing the mean RT and decreasing the impact
of increasing the number of response alternatives.
CONDITIONS WITH UNEQUAL INITIAL AND FINAL RESPONSE SET
SIZES: “ORIGINAL SELECTION” AND “RESELECTION”
In the selection and reselection conditions, some target numbers
disappeared from the initial response set. Because the initial and
final response set sizes were not correlated, we incorporated them
as independent factors in statistical analyses.
In both selected and reselected conditions, trials with longer ETs
showed shorter RTs. This effect mirrors what was found in the
no change and instructed conditions, and once again suggests that
response selection and motor preparation took place during the
ET. Further, as expected, longer RTs were found in reselection trials
due to the cost of response inhibition and reselection.
Crucially, an analysis of the slopes of the linear fits revealed
stronger dependencies of the RTs with initial response set sizes as
compared to final response set sizes. This suggests that the initial
response set size had a stronger influence on the RTs than the final
response set size. This effect was strongest particularly for long
ET conditions. Longer ETs may allow for stronger and more stable
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 202 | 8
Filevich and Haggard Persistent representation of action alternatives
encoding of the initial response set size, leading to more persistence
of the internal representation of the initial response set.
A comparison of the selected and reselected conditions revealed
that reselection processes led to longer RTs, in all response set
sizes. This is consistent with an RT cost of abandoning the initially
selected response alternative and selecting a new one.
Interestingly, however, the persistence of the response space was
not directly related to the disappearance of the selected alternative
itself. The comparison between the selected and reselected condi-
tions did not reveal differences in the RT slopes. This suggests that
the persistence of the initial set is not uniquely driven by the disap-
pearance of the selected alternative. Instead, these results suggest
that it is the non-specific encoding of the entire response set that
makes it persistent in face of external change.
This effect recalls Schacter and Addis (2007) hypothesis, from
the very different field of episodic memory, that the brain flexibly
recalls all past events, in order to constructively simulate and pre-
pare for future events. Over a shorter time scale such as our task,
recollection of all possible past experiences of action selection,
could speculatively take place in the context of working memory.
Intriguingly, a marginally significant effect of condition on the
RT slopes was found when the binary logarithm of the response
set size was considered instead of the absolute response set size.
This analysis was motivated by exploring a strict implementation
of Hick’s law, which establishes that instructed go RTs vary linearly
with the binary logarithm of the response set. However, there is
no solid empirical evidence for such a strict implementation of
Hick’s law, so the potential effects of intentional selection remain
speculative.
Additional controls showed that the significant effect of
response set size was not an artifact of the way in which RTs were
measured. Two additional controls considered complete move-
ment times, or measured RTs as the time at which the distance
traveled by the cursor was 25% of the final distance. In both cases,
a statistically significant effect of response set size was found.
PERSISTENT REPRESENTATIONS OF VOLUNTARILY SELECTED
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES
We have previously argued that the distinction between exter-
nally instructed and internally driven action systems (Krieghoff
et al., 2011) is also applicable to action inhibition (Filevich et al.,
2012). In other words, we suggest that neural systems for exter-
nally instructed inhibition (as in the case of stop signal tasks) do
not fully overlap with those for internally driven action inhibi-
tion. Moreover, the two systems may differ quantitatively as well
as qualitatively: intentional decisions for both action and inhibi-
tion may have a weaker neural signal, or lower levels of evidence,
than their instructed counterparts (Fleming et al., 2009; Filevich
and Haggard, 2012).
The present experiment revealed a process of inhibition and
subsequent reselection for intentional actions. How do these
processes fit with the intentional/instructed distinction mentioned
above? First, the initial selection of a number to which to move
was intentional, in the sense of internally generated rather than
externally triggered. The inhibition of the action was achieved by
removal of the selected item. This seems to have some features
in common with intentional inhibition, such as the absence of
an overt stop signal, but some features in common with external
inhibition, since there is an environmental change that triggers
inhibition. Our analyses focused on the persistence vs. flexible
updating of an internal representation of the response space for
intentional action selection.
Our result seems relevant to the previously introduced concepts
of parallelism and strength of evidence in action selection, in two
ways. First, persistence of action representations is naturally linked
to parallel action preparation. If an intentionally selected action is
not removed when the response set is updated, it will potentially
remain a candidate for selection, and may competitively inter-
fere with subsequent action selection processes. Second, since the
to-be-inhibited item apparently remained in the internal represen-
tation of the response space, we might conclude that the processes
of intentional inhibition are relatively weak.
We could not directly compare flexibility of the internal repre-
sentation of response spaces for internally driven and externally
instructed selection, because we did not remove any numbers
from the initial response set in instructed trials. Indeed, remov-
ing options in an instructed condition would be meaningless. If
the removed item were different from the instructed item, then
no inhibition would be expected, and if the removed item was the
instructed item, the task effectively becomes a NoGo task rather
than an instructed action task. Rather, we used our instructed con-
dition as a baseline for modeling the relationship between RTs and
set sizes. Therefore, we cannot directly compare the persistence
of action alternatives between our intentional selection and an
externally triggered alternative.
Neurophysiological data suggest that in cases of active main-
tenance of multiple response alternatives (in this case, selected
and non-selected), all representations are scaled down in propor-
tion to the total number of active representations. For example,
in a saccade-to-target experiment, Purcell et al. (2012) found that
firing rates in monkeys’ visual and motor areas decreased monot-
onically with increasingly larger response sets (two, four, or eight
total items).
The results from Purcell et al. (2012) provide a plausible neural
explanation for Hick’s law. Larger response set sizes will set a
lower baseline firing rate from which perceptual evidence needs
to be accumulated until it reaches a decision threshold (Gold and
Shadlen, 2001; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). In turn, this may translate
into longer accumulation times, manifested as longer RTs.
Accumulator models, traditionally restricted to perceptual
decision-making, have recently been extended to voluntary choices
in human behavior (Zhang et al., 2012). These, “voluntary” accu-
mulator models, analogous to perceptual models, may relate to the
present findings. Different neuronal assemblies may gather “vol-
untary” information for each target. Speculatively, spiking activity
in neuronal assemblies that correspond to the alternatives that are
no longer available may not be fully inhibited immediately after
target disappearance. In line with the results reported by Purcell
et al. (2012), initial firing rates of each neural assembly may be
lower for larger initial response set sizes in this experiment, leading
to longer intentional RTs.
Together, these results suggest an interesting corollary of the
relative weakness of internally driven decisions mentioned earlier
(Fleming et al., 2009; Filevich and Haggard, 2012). Weak internal
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decisions may set lower baseline firing rates for the representations
of each of the potential response alternatives. In turn, these weak
representations may not efficiently inhibit the representations of
the unavailable response alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Our findings suggest that persistence of unselected options in the
internal response space could be one reason why people often feel
they “could have done otherwise.” This feeling may be sufficient
to generate a feeling of freedom, even when the current external
environment in fact limits what an agent can do.
Several important mental health disorders can be linked to
counterfactual representation, including frustration, (expected
outcomes of chosen actions are not obtained), regret (desire
of having selected the alternative response alternative), and
rumination (persistence of these feelings across time). These
processes and states all require a continued representation of
action alternatives that are not actually available. Previous inves-
tigations of these concepts have been limited by the difficulty of
relating them to control of actual behaviors. Our concept of per-
sistent internal representation of items in the response space may
offer a window into understanding these processes.
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